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Judicial Globalisation and Perceptions  
of Disagreement: Two Surveys
BriaN FlaNagaN*
Using data from a 2011 judicial survey that drew responses from 
the entire New Zealand Supreme Court, I model the Court’s practice 
of transnational argument. The data suggest that whereas foreign 
law often appears to contribute to the Court’s legal conclusions, at 
times its contribution derives from an associated social reward, and 
at others is flatly illusory. I argue that these findings, in tandem with 
those of the larger survey, indicate that the law reports systematically 
misrepresent all judicial disagreement as legal disagreement, thus 
lending support to the claim that in controversial cases, the law is 
indeterminate.
I Introduction
The result of the recent burst of interest in the use of foreign law by domestic 
judges is a body of inter-court citations studies, typologies of comparison 
and	 hypotheses	 about	 judicial	 reasoning.	 Several	 broadly	 comparable	
theories	have	emerged.	These	characterise	the	use	of	foreign	law	as	both	a	
cause	and	reflection	of	increased	peer	consciousness	amongst	apex	judges,	a	
common judicial mission of individual/minority protection, and an enhanced 
sensitivity toward the possibilities of “persuasive authority”.1 Seeking data 
*Lecturer, National University of Ireland, Maynooth ; Hauser Research Scholar, NYU School 
of	Law	(2012–13).
 1 These theories take as their starting point H Patrick Glenn’s view that persuasive 
authority is “authority which attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it”: H Patrick 
Glenn	“Persuasive	Authority”	(1987)	32	McGill	LJ	261	at	263.	See	generally,	Anne-
Marie	Slaughter	“A	Typology	of	 Transjudicial	Communication”	(1994)	29	U	Rich	L	
Rev 99 at 124–125; Vicki C Jackson “Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, 
and	the	US	Court:	Gender	Equality”	(2003)	37	Loy	LA	L	Rev	271	at	287–288;	and	
Cristopher McCrudden “A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial 
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to test this school of thought, Sinéad Ahern and I embarked on a survey 
study of 10 common law supreme courts (“Judicial Decision-making and 
Transnational	Law”).2
In this paper, I extract the response of the Supreme Court of New 
Zealand	to	that	survey	to	test	three	specific	hypotheses:	that	foreign	law	is	
used by New Zealand judges to reinforce professional status; that it is used 
to enhance the quality of their legal conclusions; or that it is used to advertise 
the	merit	of	outcomes	in	whose	determination	it	has	not	in	fact	had	an	input.	
I	find	that	the	data	offer	each	hypothesis	definite	support:	whereas	foreign	
law often appears to contribute to judges’ legal conclusions, its contribution 
sometimes derives from an associated social reward, and at other times is 
flatly	illusory.
The	paper	proceeds	 in	four	parts.	Having	defined	the	subject	of	our	
inquiry, namely, the judicial use of foreign law, I identify my methodological 
assumptions.	Drawing	on	the	larger	survey,	I	then	seek	to	model	the	Court’s	
practice	 of	 transnational	 argument.	 Finally,	 I	 revisit	 the	 suggestion	 in	
“Judicial Decision-making and Transnational Law” that survey responses 
may	cast	light	on	the	nature	of	judicial	reasoning.	Specifically,	I	argue	that	
the responses indicate that the law reports systematically misrepresent all 
judicial disagreement as legal disagreement, thus lending support to the 
claim	that	in	controversial	cases,	the	law	is	indeterminate.	The	surveys	fall	
short, however, of advancing the Hart–Dworkin debate about the scope of 
legal	disagreement	and	its	implications	for	the	theory	of	law.
II Foreign Law?
Transnational legal material arrives in two forms, the norms of public 
inter	national	law,	and	of	other	states	and	other	groups	of	states.	The	status	
of these materials appears to be subtly different; judicial reliance on the 
former can seem more transparently appropriate (or less transparently 
inappropriate)	 than	 reliance	 on	 the	 latter.	Christopher	McCrudden	has	
sought to capture this contrast by way of a formal distinction between 
Conversations	on	Constitutional	Rights”	(2000)	20	OJLS	499	at	503.	Comparable	
views are expressed in Ruti Teitel “Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age” 
(2004)	117	Harv	L	Rev	2570	at	2593–2594;	Craig	Scott	and	Philip	Alston	“Adjudicating	
Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s 
Legacy	and	Grootboom’s	Promise”	(2000)	16	SAJHR	206	at	217;	and	Claire	L’Heureux-
Dubé “The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the 
Rehnquist	Court”	(1998)	34	Tulsa	LJ	15	at	16–17.
 2 Brian Flanagan and Sinéad Ahern “Judicial Decision-making and Transnational Law: 
A	Survey	of	Common	Law	Supreme	Court	Judges”	(2011)	60	ICLQ	1.
 Judicial Globalisation and Perceptions of Disagreement: Two Surveys 445
binding	and	non-binding	transnational	norms.3 For our purposes, however, 
this	distinction	is	inadequate.	If	the	consensus	of	some	set	of	countries	is	
evidence of the soundness of a legal conclusion, attention to their views is 
not	straightforwardly	“discretionary”.	Moreover,	what	exactly	it	 is	 to	be	
“binding” is a large part of the debate on the legitimacy of judicial use of 
transnational	materials.4 Distinguishing those materials in terms of what is 
“binding” risks begging the question of what status judges actually attribute 
to	different	materials.5 Conversely, ignoring the apparent difference in status 
is	liable	to	conflate	distinct	practices	of	legal	argument.6 What we need is 
a property characteristic of the form of comparative argument central to 
current	debates	about	the	legitimacy	of	the	use	of	foreign	law.
Consider a judge’s reliance on transnational material to answer a 
question with respect to which the state’s actions convey no intention that 
reference	be	made	to	such	material.	For	instance,	in	the	absence	of	official	
Irish action indicating an interest in determining domestic punishment norms 
by reference to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or 
any relevant customary international law, an Irish judge cannot appeal to the 
apparent intentions of other branches of government when invoking such 
material.	On	the	other	hand,	Ireland’s	ratification	of	a	treaty	nominating	
a particular institution as the authoritative interpreter thereof suggests an 
intention	that	Irish	law	be	exposed	to	the	work	of	that	court.	An	Irish	judge’s	
reliance on European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence could thus claim 
to	be	in	keeping	with	the	state’s	apparent	intentions.
	 3	 Christopher	McCrudden	“Judicial	Comparativism	and	Human	Rights”	in	Esin	Örücü	
and	David	Nelken	(eds)	Comparative Law: A Handbook	(Hart	Publishing,	Oxford,	2007)	
371	at	379.
 4 See Jackson, above n 1, at 302–318; Mark Tushnet “When is Knowing Less Better 
Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to 
Non-US	Law”	(2006)	90	Minn	L	Rev	1275	at	1284–1286;	and	Mayo	Moran	“Authority,	
Influence,	and	Persuasion:	Baker, Charter Values and the Puzzle of Method” in David 
Dyzenhaus	(ed)	The Unity of Public Law	(Hart,	Oxford,	2004)	389.
 5 For speculation at odds with McCrudden’s distinction, see, for example, Reem Bahdi 
“Global ization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International Law in 
Domestic	Courts”	(2002)	34	Geo	Wash	Intl	L	Rev	555	at	588:	“The	failure	to	distinguish	
between international and comparative law stems from the fact that judges look to these 
sources for their persuasive value and not out of a misguided conviction that the norms in 
question	are	binding.”;	and	Karen	Knop	“Here	and	There:	International	Law	in	Domestic	
Courts”	(2000)	32	NYUJ	Intl	Law	&	Pol	501	at	525:	“Whatever	its	limitations,	a	key	
insight of the transjudicial model of international law in domestic courts is the blurring 
of	international	law	into	comparative	law.”
	 6	 Compare	Eric	A	Posner	and	Cass	R	Sunstein	“The	Law	of	Other	States”	(2006)	59	Stan	
L	Rev	131	at	137,	n	30.
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The state’s intentions may similarly distinguish the uses of trans national 
material	in	the	determination	of	the	domestic	implications	of	treaties.	For	
instance,	where	a	state	enters	into	a	treaty	regulating	air	 traffic,	we	may	
assume that an important part of its reasons for doing so is the belief that 
there	is	an	advantage	to	regulating	air	traffic	in	the	same	manner	as	other	
nations,	even	where	that	manner	is	not	intrinsically	better	than	all	others.	
Generalising, we can say that where joining a treaty holds economy of 
scale or coordination incentives, decisions tending to bring domestic law 
into line with that of other parties can be thought to follow from the state’s 
ostensible	 intentions	in	 joining	it.7 Conversely, where a treaty holds no 
evident economy of scale or coordination incentive, judicial reliance on 
the	interpretations	given	to	it	by	other	parties	would	not	clearly	so	follow.8 
Treaties concerning individual rights would appear to fall predominantly 
into	the	latter	category.
We appear to have located a property characteristic of the most contentious 
form of reliance on transnational material: the absence of an intention on 
the part of the state that the legal question be resolved by reference to the 
material	in	question.	For	our	purposes	then,	a	judge	uses	“foreign	law”	where	
the state’s actions fail to convey the intention that the question be answered 
with	reference	to	the	material	employed.	Thus,	our	focus	is	on	judicial	regard	
to	the	(domestic	and	international)	laws	of	other	nations	in	the	process	of	
determining	the	application	of	a	domestic	or	treaty	norm	on	individual	rights.
 7 Recall the attention of the European Court of Justice to attributing such qualities to 
the European Economic Community Treaty in its foundational Van Gend en Loos v 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 decision: “The objective of 
the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the functioning of which is of 
direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more 
than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting 
states.	…	[It	is	also	designed]	to	secure	uniform	interpretation	of	the	Treaty	by	national	
courts	and	tribunals”.	Joseph	Weiler,	explaining	the	positive	reception	of	 the	ECJ’s	
constitutional jurisprudence among national judiciaries, observes that it seemed to them, 
“to	reflect	a	plausible	reading	of	the	purposes	of	the	treaty	to	which	member	states	had	
solemnly	adhered.”	Joseph	Weiler	“A	Quiet	Revolution:	The	European	Court	of	Justice	
and	its	Interlocutors”	(1994)	26	Comparative	Political	Studies	510	at	521.
 8 Compare Ulrich Drobnig “The Use of Comparative Law by Courts” in Ulrich Drobnig 
and	Sjef	van	Erp	(eds)	The Use of Comparative Law by Courts: XIVth International 
Congress of Comparative Law	(Kluwer	Law	International,	The	Hague,	1999)	3	at	6	
(distinguishing between the “voluntariness” of judicial recourse to non-domestic material 
in the interpretation of international agreements for which uniformity is desirable and 
recourse	to	such	material	where	uniformity	is	not	a	concern).
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III Method
The role of a member of the South African Constitutional Court appears to 
have	much	in	common	with	that	of	his	Irish	and	Australian	counterparts.	The	
coincidence	of	a	culture	of	judicial	independence,	conflicts	with	electorally	
legitimated actors, a broadly common law tradition, and the privilege of 
finality,	seems	to	generate	a	distinctive	professional	role.	Seeking	to	help	
explain the use of transnational legal argument by those occupying that role, 
Ahern and I surveyed the judges of the British House of Lords, the Caribbean 
Court of Justice, the High Court of Australia, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, and the Supreme Courts of Ireland, India, Israel, Canada, New 
Zealand	and	the	United	States.
Work on design of the questionnaire began in October 2005 and included 
exploratory	meetings	with	two	British	Law	Lords.	The	decision	to	proceed	
with a questionnaire involving structured and unstructured elements 
was taken with a view to maximising the depth and comparability of the 
elicited	data.	Providing	the	opportunity	for	judges	to	express	their	views	
on	the	nature	of	the	questions	posed	also	promised	a	greater	response	rate.	
Including	“follow-ons”,	the	final	survey	contained	a	total	of	25	questions.	
They appeared in a combination of multi-check, exclusive check, open-
ended	and	simple	ranking	formats.	In	the	first	week	of	December	2005,	
letters	were	sent	to	the	memberships	of	the	surveyed	courts.	Over	the	course	
of	the	next	three	months,	43	responses	were	received.
With a few clear exceptions, the apex judges of all democratic jurisdictions 
operating within a broadly common law tradition under conditions of judicial 
independence	were	surveyed	(103	judges	in	total).	Accordingly,	assuming	
the suggested professional role, our survey is a reasonable snapshot of the 
views	of	those	occupying	it.	Assuming	further	that	we	can	learn	about	judicial	
reasoning from judicial descriptions, the survey provides a basis for testing 
hypotheses.9 Overall, we found that the conception of apex judges citing 
foreign	law	as	a	source	of	persuasive	authority	is	of	limited	application.	
Citational opportunism and the aspiration to membership of an emerging 
international	judicial	“guild”	appear	to	be	equally	important	motivations.
IV Modelling the Use of Foreign Law
Consistently with the larger survey, the New Zealand data establish that 
foreign	judges	form	a	significant	professional	reference	group	for	New	
Zealand judges: each noted that they felt “a sense of high professional 
	 9	 For	a	defence	of	this	assumption	see	Flanagan	and	Ahern,	above	n	2,	at	7–9.
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esteem	for	Supreme	Court	judges	from	other	jurisdictions”	(Q	3),	with	all	
but one attributing this esteem to their possession of “equivalent profes-
sional	responsibilities”.10 All but one agreed that they make indirect use of 
their	legal	knowledge	of	other	countries	in	their	judgments	on	rights	(Q	8)	
and that they hold supreme court judges from other jurisdictions in greater 
professional	esteem	than	their	domestic	subordinates	(Q	3B).	Likewise,	most	
said that personal contacts with foreign supreme court judges contributed to 
their	analysis	of	domestic	rights	(Q	14)	and	that	of	five	different	speeches	on	
rights that they would prioritise attendance at that given by the foreign judge 
(Q	16).	With	respect	to	Questions	3B,	14	and	16,	we	found	that	New	Zealand	
judges	gave	slightly	greater	priority	to	foreign	judges	than	judges	generally.11
The	esteem	in	which	foreign	judges	are	held	is	reflected	in	the	attitude	
toward	the	citation	of	foreign	law.	Thus,	asked	about	the	frequency	with	
which they refer to the law of other national jurisdictions in their judgments 
on	rights,	all	 judges	characterised	themselves	as	regular	users.	Similarly,	
asked about the frequency with which they use comparative material in 
justifying	their	legal	conclusions	on	rights,	all	but	one	answered	“regularly”.	
New	Zealand	esteem	for	foreign	judges	is	also	reflected	in	the	importance	
attributed to international human rights law, with four judges placing it 
ahead of the “domestic constitution” as the tool “most useful for identifying 
the	protection	to	be	given	to	rights	asserted	in	your	court”	(Q	4).	Again,	in	
each case, we found that New Zealand judges displayed a relatively greater 
receptiveness	to	transnational	material	than	judges	generally.
In “Judicial Decision-making and Transnational Law”, we considered 
three prominent hypotheses about the use of foreign law in the interpretation 
of	individual	rights.	First,	that	it	is	used	to	reinforce	professional	status;12 
 10 All six members of the 2005 New Zealand Supreme Court (Elias CJ; Tipping, McGrath, 
Blanchard,	Gault	and	Keith	JJ)	responded,	the	first	three	of	whom	remain	on	the	Court.	
In order to report the responses of the New Zealand Court in isolation it was necessary 
to	secure	the	permission	of	the	participating	New	Zealand	judges.	I	wrote	to	the	New	
Zealand	participants	in	early	October	2011	and	promptly	received	their	consent.
 11	 See	Flanagan	and	Ahern,	above	n	2,	at	13–15.
 12 See Anne-Marie Slaughter A New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2004)	at	101,	observing	of	inter-supreme	court	citation	that	“the	psychological	impact	is	
considerable, leading judges to feel part of a larger judicial community”; Bahdi, above 
n 5, at 595: “Increasingly, judges want to belong not simply to a domestic community 
of	judges	but	also	to	an	international	juridical	community.	Greater	interaction	between	
judges	in	both	real	and	virtual	space	both	reflects	and	promotes	this	judicial	desire	to	
belong	to	a	transnational	community	of	their	peers.”;	and	Ernest	A	Young	“Foreign	
Law	and	the	Denominator	Problem”	(2005)	119	Harv	L	Rev	148	at	157:	“Interactions	
between legal elites on a global scale make it increasingly likely that the views of 
lawyers and jurists abroad will form part of the reference set for our own Justices as 
they	formulate	their	own	moral	views.”
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second, that it is used to enhance legal conclusions;13 and third, that it is used 
opportunistically to indicate the merit of outcomes in whose determination 
it	has	not	in	fact	had	an	input.14 The hypotheses appear mutually exclusive, 
in the sense that they will explain exclusively rather than jointly a given 
use	of	foreign	law.	In	testing	them	with	respect	to	the	New	Zealand	Court’s	
use of foreign law, we are assisted by correlations revealed in the larger 
survey.	Consider	the	hypothesis	that	judges	are	seeking	to	be	rewarded	with	
professional	approval	or	acceptance	from	their	counterparts	elsewhere.
In	 the	 larger	 survey,	we	 found	a	 statistically	 significant	correlation	
between the prioritisation of attendance at a foreign judge’s speech on 
rights	and	the	justificatory	citation	of	foreign	law	(Qs	6	&	16).15 In “Judicial 
Decision-making and Transnational Law”, we assumed that a desire to use 
foreign law to enhance one’s legal conclusions would lead one to seek out the 
views	of	a	foreign	judge.	Accordingly,	we	treated	the	finding	as	“consistent	
with”	rather	than	“positively	supporting”	the	social	reward	hypothesis.16 In 
hindsight, however, there seems no reason to expect attendance at a speech 
on rights by a foreign counterpart over one by a local/foreign academic or a 
domestic	subordinate.	If	one	is	interested	in	increasing	one’s	appreciation	of	
foreign judicial perspectives on rights it makes sense to attend that speech, 
but	why	prioritise	the	foreign	judicial	perspective	on	rights	in	the	first	place?	
The collective New Zealand prioritisation of the foreign judge’s speech 
would thus seem to support the theory that New Zealand judges cite foreign 
law	for	social	reward.	We	also	identified	a	statistically	significant	correlation	
between the expression of a greater sense of professional esteem for foreign 
judges and the characterisation of international human rights law as the tool 
most	useful	for	resolving	rights	questions	(Qs	3B	&	4).17 We speculated that 
international human rights law may be seen by some as providing a socially 
 13	 See	Jeremy	Waldron	‘Foreign	Law	and	the	Modern	Ius	Gentium’	(2005)	119	Harv	L	
Rev 129 at 146 “[F]or those who see legal decision as a matter of reasoning one’s way 
through problems, my account [of it as a matter of patient analysis, the untangling of 
issues, the ascertaining of just resolutions, and the learning and cooperation that is 
characteristic	of	a	scientific	approach]	may	help	to	explain	why	courts	turn	naturally	to	
foreign	law.”
 14 See Roper v Simmons	543	US	551	(2005)	at	627	per	Scalia	J	dissenting:	“To	invoke	alien	
law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned 
decision-making,	but	sophistry.”;	and	Pradyumna	K	Tripathi	“Foreign	Precedents	and	
Constitutional	Law”	(1957)	57	Colum	L	Rev	319	at	346,	who	argues	that	the	reasons	
directing the choice of foreign precedents “seem to possess no compelling force of their 
own; … any or all of them could be conveniently ignored altogether; and, of course, any 
of	them	could	be	cited	in	support	of	a	decision	where	it	happens	to	suit”.
 15	 Flanagan	and	Ahern,	above	n	2,	at	15.
 16	 At	18–19.
 17	 At	19.
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rewarding opportunity to engage in the interpretation of common legal 
instruments.	Accordingly,	the	application	of	the	social	reward	hypothesis	to	
the New Zealand Court also appears to be supported by the large proportion 
of New Zealand judges who describe international human rights law as the 
tool	most	useful	for	resolving	rights	questions.18 As against this hypothesis, 
however, the response to Question 9 reveals little concern for peer approval:
Which, if any, of the following considerations might justify the citation of 
comparative material in the interpretation of domestic rights? (Please rate 
in	order	of	importance)	8	=	highest.
(a)	 The	gains	to	your	state’s	 international	standing	from	a	visible	
judicial	engagement	with	foreign	ideas	and	attitudes.
(b)	 It	provides	an	additional	source	of	impartial	guidance	(such	as	
precedent),	thus	facilitating	objectivity	in	judicial	interpretation.
(c)	 It	provides	an	additional	factual	source,	thus	enabling	the	court	
to make more accurate predictions as to the effects of challenged 
laws	and	rights.
(d)	 It	provides	an	additional	source	of	legal	authority,	thus	increasing	
the chances that a legal authority can be found to match what you 
already	believe	to	be	the	best	result	from	a	policy	perspective.
(e)	 It	assists	the	work	of	establishing	enlightened	approaches	to	rights	
in	emerging	democracies.
(f )	 The	 importance	 of	 upholding	 comity	 between	 judges	 inter-
nationally.
(g)	 It	demonstrates	that	the	judicial	review	of	legislation	for	compat-
ibility	with	rights	also	happens	in	other	respectable	democracies.
(h)	 Other	—	please	specify.
Thirty	per	cent	of	respondents	 to	 the	 larger	survey	ranked	(b)	 the	most	
important consideration justifying the citation of comparative material; eight 
respondents	(20	per	cent)	ranked	(d)	the	most	important;	five	(12.5	per	cent)	
ranked	(e)	most	important;	while	the	rest	received	negligible	attention.	A	
similar	distribution	is	apparent	in	the	New	Zealand	responses.	The	most	
important consideration justifying citation of comparative material for New 
Zealand judges was its status as a “source of impartial guidance” (half the 
Court).	Two	judges	specified	(d)	as	most	important,	with	another	rating	it	
second	most	important.	Conversely,	the	considerations	most	closely	related	
to comparison for professional approval namely, comparison for the sake 
of	comity	between	international	judges	((f ))	or	for	gains	to	one’s	state’s	
 18 The sole judge who did not indicate greater esteem for foreign judges than domestic 
subordinates was one of the two who did not characterise international human rights as 
the	most	important	tool	for	determining	litigants’	rights.
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international standing from visible judicial engagement with foreign ideas 
and	attitudes	((a)),	received	negligible	attention.19
Consider now the hypothesis that judges look to foreign law to enhance 
their	 legal	conclusions.	The	hypothesis	is	supported	by	the	indication	by	
all but one New Zealand judge that they make indirect use of their legal 
knowledge of other countries: without citation, no other reward seems 
liable	to	accrue.20 Whereas such usage appears in tension with the principle 
that the legal reasons for judgment must be cited, one New Zealand judge, 
noting his use of “the democratic elements in great US decisions” with “little 
express acknowledgement” compared this practice to his attention, both 
as advocate and as judge, to the writings of a prominent twentieth century 
legal	theorist.	For	this	judge	at	least,	it	may	be	that,	just	like	philosophical	
writings or artistic expression, foreign court opinions may contribute to 
forming a legal conclusion not by any persuasive authority, but purely by 
their	actual	persuasiveness.	Where	an	idea	contributes	purely	on	foot	of	its	
persuasiveness, its source does not count in favour of the conclusion reached, 
and, hence, requires no acknowledgement on the principle that legal reasons 
for	judgment	are	to	be	cited.
Equally, the hypothesis is consistent with the fact that, like their peers 
internationally, most New Zealand judges say their approach to comparison is 
affected by a concern that they may not fully appreciate the legal and factual 
context	surrounding	material	from	other	jurisdictions	(Q	13).21 As against it, 
however, there is the failure of two New Zealand judges to indicate adherence 
to	general	criteria	in	assessing	a	jurisdiction’s	comparability	(Q	10),22 and 
the Court’s less than emphatic selection of “impartial guidance” as the most 
important	justification	for	the	citation	of	comparative	material	(Q	9).
Finally, there is the hypothesis that foreign judges and legal systems are 
a faux reference group; that they are used to advertise the merit of decisions 
 19 Similarly, in response to Question 12 only one New Zealand judge included “The 
international	community”	as	part	of	their	judgments’	typical	audience.	In	keeping	with	
the general trend, all New Zealand judges included “The parties to the dispute” and most 
included	the	“Agencies/Organs	of	the	State”.
 20	 See	Judith	Resnik	“Law	as	affiliation:	‘Foreign’	law,	democratic	federalism,	and	the	
sovereigntism	of	the	nation-state”	(2008)	6	ICON	33	at	46	(judges	are	learning	from	
each	other	through	“silent	dialogues”).
 21	 See	Hugh	Collins	“Methods	and	Aims	of	Comparative	Contract	Law”	(1991)	11	Oxford	
J	Legal	Stud	396	at	397–398	(illustrating	the	difficulties	presented	by	the	potential	
interdependence	of	different	elements	of	a	foreign	legal	system);	and	Adrienne	Stone	
“Comparativism in Constitutional Interpretation” [2009] NZ L Rev 45 at 63 (raising this 
concern	in	the	constitutional	context).
 22	 Responses	ranged	from	specifying	no	particular	jurisdictional	criteria	(two	judges)	to	
specifying	that	a	jurisdiction	may	be	democratic	(four	judges)	to	insisting	that	it	must	
also	fall	within	the	common	law	tradition	(two	judges).
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in	whose	determination	they	in	fact	had	no	input.	This	is	supported	by	the	
response to Q 9, for which a third of the Court stated that the most important 
reason for resort to comparative material is that it increases the chances that 
a legal authority can be found to match what one already believes to be the 
best	result	from	a	policy	perspective	((d)).	Seeking	legal	authorities	to	match	
what one already believes to be the best policy is conceptually distinct from 
searching for citations as “sales puff ” for what one anyway believes to be 
the	only	legally	correct	decision.	It	is	also	distinct	from	reaching	a	policy	
decision by way of foreign examples; the decision is already	made.
Perhaps suspecting that its wording admits of more than one interpretation, 
or that judges cannot be expected to be able to clearly distinguish the notions 
of law and policy, critics have expressed scepticism about the foregoing 
interpretation	of	Q	9.23	Care	was	taken,	however,	 that	option	(d)	would	
portray the selection of comparative material as subsequent to the judge’s 
decision	on	 the	 result,	 itself	made	on	non-legal	grounds.	The	order	of	
decision with respect to result and citation is expressed by the inclusion 
of	the	term	“already”.	Likewise,	the	contrast	between	legal	and	non-legal	
reasoning is uncontroversially expressed in terms of decisions taken “from 
a	policy	perspective”.	Accordingly,	 it	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that,	
literally	speaking,	(d)	expresses	neither	ambiguity	between	legal	and	non-
legal	reasoning	nor	between	a	judgment’s	basis	and	its	presentation.	Second,	
we	should	be	wary	of	attributing	to	judges	any	difficulty	in	distinguishing	the	
notions	of	law	and	policy.	Such	difficulty	has	been	attributed	by	scholars	in	
response to what they regard as the sincere but often erroneous judicial belief 
that a decision was legally entailed: “Unconscious preconceptions … are the 
key to reconciling the attitudinal literature with what judges think they are 
doing”.24 It seems incautious for the theorist who distinguishes legal from 
non-legal	considerations	to	deny	judges’	ability	to	do	likewise.25
 23	 Elaine	Mak	“Why	do	Dutch	and	UK	Judges	Cite	Foreign	Law?”	(2011)	70	CLJ	420	at	
421–422 (noting “drawbacks … as regards the reliability of conclusions drawn about 
the	significance	…	of	specific	answers	given”).
 24 See Richard A Posner How Judges Think	(Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge	(Mass),	
2008)	at	107.	The	attitudinal	research	to	which	Judge	Posner	is	referring	—	the	“law	
and	courts”	field	of	American	political	science	—	has	found	strong	correlations	between	
Justices’	political	affiliations	and	their	votes	on	various	questions.	See	similarly	Maris	
Köpcke	Tinturé	“Law	Does	Things	Differently”	(2010)	55	Am	J	Juris	201	at	215:	
“([H]igher)	 judges	face	constraints	 that	 the	rest	of	us	do	not,	and	these	constraints	
combine	to	increase	both	the	operation	of	unconscious	influences	on	decisions	and	the	
desire	by	the	decision-maker	to	appear	(even	to	oneself )	as	having	chosen	the	uniquely	
correct	or	the	better	option”.
 25 Posner, above n 24, at 94 (distinguishing “cases to which the orthodox legal materials 
do	…	speak	clearly”	and	“the	open	area,	where	judges	are	legislators”).
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In	addition	to	finding	support	in	the	response	to	Q	9,	the	hypothesis	that	
foreign law is cited opportunistically by New Zealand judges is consistent 
with	the	results	of	a	recent	citation	study.	It	has	been	reported	that,	of	the	75	
reported cases in which the New Zealand Court referred to overseas rights-
based decisions from 1990 to April 2006, only:26
28 of them include[d] a reference to an overseas case that did not support 
the	New	Zealand	court’s	eventual	conclusion	…	[a]nd	that	figure	overstates	
things to the extent that in some cases only one of the multiple [concurring] 
judgments	[relying	on	foreign	law]	made	such	a	reference.
Finally, the hypothesis is consistent with the admittedly sparse empirical 
work	on	other	common	law	supreme	courts.27
Taken as a whole, the data do not decisively favour any of the three 
examined	hypotheses.	Each	has	definite	support.	Thus,	in	line	with	the	larger	
survey,	we	find	that	whereas	foreign	law	often	appears	to	contribute	to	New	
Zealand judges’ conclusions on rights, its contribution may sometimes derive 
from	an	associated	social	reward,	and	at	other	times	may	be	flatly	illusory.
V Saving the Appearance of Judicial Disagreement
A legal disagreement is a disagreement over a proposition’s legal validity 
which	admits	of	a	fact	of	the	matter.	Hartian	legal	positivism,	the	theory	that	
a legal system’s “ultimate criteria of legal validity … must be effectively 
accepted	as	common	public	standards	of	official	behaviour”28 is famously 
criticised by Ronald Dworkin as failing to account for the scope of legal 
disagreement.29 Dworkin argues that a legal disagreement may admit of a fact 
 26 James Allan, Grant Huscroft and Nessa Lynch “The Citation of Overseas Authority in 
Rights	Litigation	in	New	Zealand:	How	Much	Bark?	How	Much	Bite?”	(2007)	11	Otago	
LR	433	at	440.	It	was	suggested	to	me	that	considerations	of	courtesy	might	inhibit	the	
Court	from	explicitly	noting	its	divergence	from	other	supreme	courts.	But	this	would	
be an ad hoc explanation: our test for courtesy-driven inhibition would be met whenever 
a	divergence	failed	to	be	noted.
 27 See Bijon Roy “An Empirical Survey of Foreign Jurisprudence and International 
Instruments in Charter	Litigation”	(2004)	62	UT	Fac	L	Rev	99	(as	discussed	in	Flanagan	
and	Ahern,	above	n	2,	at	23–24);	and	Alan	Paterson	The Law Lords (Macmillan Press, 
London,	1982)	at	19:	“[T]he	Law	Lords	have	experienced	little	or	no	difficulty	 in	
rejecting or ignoring the consensus of these other countries [those typically cited] when 
they	prefer	to	retain	their	own	line”.
 28 HLA Hart The Concept of Law	(2nd	ed,	Oxford	University	Press,	London,	1994)	at	116.
 29 Now travelling under the title, “the semantic sting”, the objection made its debut in 
Ronald	Dworkin	“Social	Rules	and	Legal	Theory”	(1972)	81	Yale	LJ	855.
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of	the	matter	which	is	not	determined	by	an	agreed	criterion	of	legal	validity.	
Debate has focused on whether controversial appellate cases involve such 
disagreement.	If	so,	then,	contrary	to	Hart,	legal	validity	is	not	determined	
by	agreed	criteria.
In “Judicial Decision-making and Transnational Law”, we suggested that 
our survey data could be used to assess the prevalence of legal disagreement 
in appellate cases, and, hence, the strength of Dworkin’s objection to Hartian 
positivism.	 I	 now	 think	 this	 suggestion	was	 overstated.	A	finding	 that	
Dworkin exaggerates the volume of legal disagreement is no defence to his 
objection.	If	so	much	as	a	single	legal	disagreement	admits	of	a	fact	of	the	
matter which is not determined by an agreed criterion, it follows that legal 
validity	is	not	determined	by	agreed	criteria.	So	long	as	Dworkin	identifies	
a	single	instance	of	such	disagreement,	his	objection	succeeds.30
A solution to the Dworkin–Hart debate is not going to be found through 
surveys	of	judges.	That	is	not	to	say,	however,	that	survey	evidence	on	the	
nature of judicial disagreement has no	bearing	on	legal	theory.	It	bears	directly	
on the question of the extent of legal determinacy, that is, of the proportion 
of	legal	questions	with	determinate	answers.	Formally,	judicial	reasoning	
is	always	cast	in	legal	terms.	On	the	evidence	of	official	judicial	opinion,	
therefore,	the	law	is	invariably	determinate.31	To	the	extent	that	confidential	
judicial surveys contradict the evidence of formal judicial opinion, the thesis 
that the law is indeterminate no longer has the disadvantage of failing to 
save	the	appearance	that	judges	perceive	it	otherwise.	Accordingly,	judicial	
surveys can help establish the plausibility of the “indeterminacy” thesis, the 
claim	that	judicial	disagreement	is	never	legal	in	nature.32
 30 I pursue an alternative defence of Hartian positivism in Flanagan Criterial Concepts of 
Legal Validity: The Objection from Disagreement (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of 
Law,	2012)	(forthcoming).
 31 Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire	(Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge	(Mass),	1986)	at	
90: “The old plain-fact picture … told us not to take the opinions judges write in hard 
cases at face value; the new picture [of jurisprudence] has the signal merit of allowing 
us once again to believe what our judges say”; David O Brink “Legal Interpretation, 
Objectivity,	and	Morality”	in	Brian	Leiter	(ed)	Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge 
University	Press,	Cambridge,	2001)	12	at	48:	“[I]nterpreters	typically	act	as	if	hard	cases	
have	a	best	[legal]	interpretation”;	Ken	Kress	“The	Interpretive	Turn”	(1989)	97	Ethics	
834 at 859: “Dworkin’s most powerful descriptive criticisms of conventionalism focus 
on the phenomenology of judging in hard cases”; and Joseph Raz “Two Views of the 
Nature	of	 the	Theory	of	Law:	A	Partial	Comparison”	in	Jules	Coleman	(ed)	Hart’s 
Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 
New	York,	2001)	1	at	34,	n	46:	“[Judges]	believe	that	their	decisions	always	represent	
the	state	of	the	law	at	a	time	just	prior	to	their	decision”.
 32 The claim is defended by a range of contemporary theorists: Mark V Tushnet “Defending 
the	Indeterminacy	Thesis”	in	Brian	Bix	(ed)	Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory 
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The indeterminacy thesis is stated in general terms so that it may form 
part	of	an	explanation	of	 the	nature	of	 legal	 reasoning.	So	stated,	both	
surveys under discussion are representative of judges whose disagreements 
are characterised as non-legal but who produce formal reasoning cast in legal 
terms.	By	contradicting	the	evidence	of	judges’	formal	reasoning,	a	survey	
may indicate that they believe that they engage in legal disagreement less 
frequently	than	had	hitherto	appeared.33
The next issue is whether the surveys actually shed light on judicial 
reasoning.	We	must	consider	whether	the	respondents’	descriptions	of	their	
reasoning process are liable to be biased by the prospect of professional, 
academic,	or	popular	(dis)approval.	That	is	the	major	evidential	hazard	posed	
by	formal	judicial	reasoning:	a	legal	basis	will	aid	a	judge’s	justificatory	task;	
especially in the case of disagreement with colleagues who are themselves 
appealing	to	legal	authority	on	behalf	of	the	alternative.34 The advantage of 
surveys	promising	confidentiality	is	that	they	do	not	identify	the	respondent	
or,	typically,	any	particular	decision	that	they	have	made.	Nevertheless,	the	
concern remains that judicial responses are liable to be biased:35
[Judges] may endorse the plain-fact picture as a piece of formal juris-
prudence	when	asked	 in	properly	grave	 tones	what	 law	is.	But	 in	 less	
guarded	moments	they	tell	a	different	and	more	romantic	story.
Dworkin’s concern is that, should they be asked overtly jurisprudential 
questions, judges are liable to indicate conformity with prevailing academic 
expectations	of	legal	indeterminacy	in	appellate	cases.36 In contrast, some 
(Oxford	University	Press,	New	York,	1998)	223;	Brian	Leiter	“Explaining	Theoretical	
Disagreement”	(2009)	76	U	Chi	L	Rev	1215;	and	Dennis	Patterson	“Methodology	and	
Theoretical	Disagreement”	in	Ulla	Neergaard,	Ruth	Nielsen	and	Lynn	Roseberry	(eds)	
European Legal Method: Paradoxes and Revitalisation	(Djoef	Publishing,	2011)	130.
 33 See Dworkin, above n 31, at 39: “[T]here is no positive evidence of any kind that when 
…	judges	seem	to	be	disagreeing	about	the	law	they	are	really	keeping	their	fingers	
crossed”.
 34 Compare Dworkin, above n 31, at 37: “[W]hy should lawyers and judges pretend to 
theoretical disagreement in cases like these?”
 35	 Dworkin,	above	n	31,	at	10.	See	further	Ronald	Dworkin	“Pragmatism,	Right	Answers,	
and	True	Banality”	in	Michael	Brint	and	William	Weaver	(eds)	Pragmatism in Law and 
Society (Westview	Press,	Boulder,	1991)	359	at	365:	“They	[critics]	think	I	must	be	
saying not just that there are right answers in some ordinary way, as an unselfconscious 
lawyer	might	say	that”	(emphasis	added);	and	the	discussion	in	Paterson,	above	n	27,	
at 194–195 citing Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge	(Mass),	1977)	at	352.
 36 See also Stephen Guest “Objectivity and Value: Legal Arguments and the Fallibility 
of	Judges”	in	Michael	Freeman	and	Ross	Harrison	(eds)	Law and Philosophy (Oxford 
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theorists worry that judges will tend to refrain from expressing a sincere 
description of their reasoning process for fear of being thought to reach 
decisions that are not legally entailed:37
[S]ocial	desirability	effects,	and	flat-out	lying,	would	mar	any	such	analysis.	
Judicial nominees who can state under oath before the entire nation that 
they had never thought about Roe v. Wade can hardly be fruitful candidates 
for	traditional	survey	measures.
The fact that judicial surveys on decision-making are impugned for exerting 
pressure on their subjects to express both adherence to and disavowal of the 
same thesis does not necessarily mean that no pressure is exerted; perhaps 
different	audiences	are	at	work.	What	it	does	make	less	likely,	though,	is	
that	 there	 is	very	much	pressure	one	way	or	 the	other.	In	any	case,	 two	
factors	combine	to	mitigate	any	pressure	that	might	exist.	First,	in	promising	
not to analyse the data court by court, the larger survey offered uniquely 
broad	protection	for	candid	answering.	Second,	 the	only	answer	option	
explicitly	conceding	non-legal	reasoning	(Q9	(d))	concerned	the	justification	
for citation of a particular source of law, that is, foreign law, rather than the 
evaluation	of	a	general	legal	theory.
Analysing	the	respective	survey	data,	we	found	that	significant	minorities	
of judges cite foreign law to justify policy-based legal decisions or follow 
it	 to	reinforce	their	professional	status.	The	surveys	suggest	 that,	where	
foreign law is in the frame, judges may not always, or perhaps even mostly, 
be	arguing	over	the	law	as	it	is,	but	over	what	it	should	be.	That	implies,	in	
turn, that notwithstanding the reasoning entered in the law reports, judges 
may	not	perceive	their	disagreements	as	legal	in	character.	Moreover,	the	
cases in which foreign law is in the frame are those of which the judicial 
perception of merely legal disagreement jars most with the indeterminacy 
thesis.	Citation	studies	show	that	the	more	foreign	law	judicially	cited	in	
an appellate case the greater the disagreement over the result, a correlation 
which,	given	our	findings	about	the	use	of	foreign	law,	suggests	that	the	
University	Press,	Oxford,	2007)	76	at	90,	n	19:	“Are	the	highest	appellate	courts	…	[a]	
place where the different statements of law are not correctable … ? It seems unlikely, not 
least because of the way lawyers, and the courts themselves, unphilosophically speak” 
(emphasis	added).
 37	 Jeffrey	A	Segal	and	Harold	J	Spaeth	“The	Authors	Respond”	(1994)	4(1)	Law	and	Courts	
10	at	12.	Similarly,	Lee	Epstein	and	Gary	King	“The	Rules	of	Inference”	(2002)	69	U	
Chi	L	Rev	1	at	93–94.
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law reports systematically misrepresent all judicial disagreement as legal 
disagreement.38
By contradicting the evidence of judges’ formal reasoning, the surveys 
indicate that judges believe that they engage in legal disagreement less 
frequently	than	had	hitherto	appeared.	They	therefore	help	to	secure	the	
indeterminacy thesis from the criticism that it fails to account for the 
appearance	of	judicial	disagreement	to	those	engaged	in	it.
VI Appendix
Dear Judicial Participant,
You	are	very	welcome	to	our	Study	in	Comparative	Legal	Method.
You	have	successfully	reached	your	online	questionnaire	webpage.	Here	you	
will	find	simple	instructions	on	how	to	complete	the	form	below.	Many	thanks	for	
your	goodwill	towards	the	project,	it	is	much	appreciated.
Please	read	the	word	“rights”	to	mean	human	and/or	civil	rights.	You	may	
well feel that your answers to certain questions depend on factors other than those 
mentioned.	Do	not	let	this	deter	you	from	answering	the	questions	as	only	limited	
conclusions	are	to	be	drawn	from	them.	Moreover,	feel	free	to	note	any	such	factors	
or	additional	comments	in	the	comments	box	below	each	question.
Bear	in	mind	that	your	participation	in	this	study	is	entirely	confidential	—	no	
references	whatsoever	will	be	made	either	to	specific	participants	or	their	courts.	
All	information	will	be	wiped	as	soon	as	the	data	is	collated.†
And	finally,	please	remember	to	click	the	SAVE	button	at	the	bottom.	You	can	
return	later	to	complete	unfinished	areas.
 38 See CL Ostberg, Matthew E Wetstein and Craig R Ducat “Attitudes, Precedents and 
Cultural Change: Explaining the Citations of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court 
of	Canada”	(2001)	34	CJPS	377	at	396:	“Citations	to	other	than	Canadian	precedents	
grow	as	the	number	of	concurring	or	dissenting	opinions	in	a	given	case	escalates.”	See	
similarly Shannon Ishiyama Smithey “A Tool, Not a Master: The Use of Foreign Case 
Law	in	Canada	and	South	Africa”	(2001)	34	Comparative	Political	Studies	1188	at	1200,	
1202–1203; and Steven G Calabresi and Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl “The Supreme Court 
and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty	Decision”	(2005)	47	Wm	&	Mary	L	Rev	743	at	755:	“[T]he	[United	States	
Supreme] Court has tended to cite foreign law in some of [what the authors regard as] 
its	most	problematic	opinions”.
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Question 1
In those parts of your judgments which relate to rights, to what extent do you refer 
to the law in other national jurisdictions?
•	 Regularly
•	 Occasionally
•	 Rarely
•	 Never
Question 2
If you use law from other national jurisdictions in relation to rights is it primarily 
as a source of
•	 Different methods of legal reasoning OR
•	 Information on moral attitudes OR
•	 Information on the consequences of a particular decision
•	 Other — please specify
Question 3
Do you feel a sense of high professional esteem for Supreme Court judges from 
other jurisdictions?
•	 Yes
•	 To some extent
•	 Not particularly
[Those who answered “yes” or “to some extent” were asked] Question 3A
Does this sense of professional esteem derive from
 
(a)	 Having equivalent professional responsibilities
(b)	 Attendance at international judicial conferences
(c)	 Participation in international judicial education programmes and bodies 
such as the Commonwealth Judicial Education Institute
(d)	 Bilateral visits and contacts with members of foreign judiciaries
(e)	 Other reason — please specify
[And] Question 3B:
Is this sense of professional esteem greater than that which you feel towards 
subordinate judges in your own jurisdiction?
•	 Greater sense of professional esteem for supreme court judges abroad
•	 Equal sense of professional esteem for supreme court judges abroad
•	 Lower sense of professional esteem for supreme court judges abroad
†All	questionnaire	pages	were	deleted	from	the	Balliol	College	server	in	June	2006.
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Question 4 [all participants]
Which tool do you consider most useful for identifying the protection to be given 
to rights asserted in your court?
•	 The domestic constitution
•	 International human rights law
•	 Moral thinking on human nature
•	 Religion
•	 Another means — please specify
Question 5
How often do you attend international judicial conferences?
•	 Regularly
•	 Occasionally
•	 Rarely
•	 Never
Question 5A
If you believe such conferences are worthwhile is it because they are a helpful 
source of information
(a)	 On different methods of legal reasoning
(b)	 On the moral viewpoints prevailing elsewhere
(c)	 On the consequences of adopting particular legal rules
(d)	 Other — please specify
Question 6
Do you use comparative material in justifying your legal conclusions on rights?
•	 Regularly
•	 Occasionally
•	 Rarely
•	 Never
Question 7
Do you think that comparative material provides a greater range of citations than 
domestic law?
•	 Yes
•	 To some extent
•	 Not particularly
•	 No
•	 Don’t know
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Question 8
Do you make indirect use of your legal knowledge of other countries in your 
judgments on rights?
•	 Yes
•	 To some extent
•	 Not particularly
•	 No
•	 Don’t know
Question 8A
How would you explain this usage?
Question 9
Which, if any, of the following considerations might justify the citation of 
comparative material in the interpretation of domestic rights? (Please rate in order 
of	importance)	8	=	highest.
(a)	 The	gains	 to	your	state’s	 international	standing	from	a	visible	 judicial	
engagement	with	foreign	ideas	and	attitudes.
(b)	 It	provides	an	additional	source	of	impartial	guidance	(such	as	precedent),	
thus	facilitating	objectivity	in	judicial	interpretation.
(c)	 It	provides	an	additional	factual	source,	thus	enabling	the	court	to	make	
more	accurate	predictions	as	to	the	effects	of	challenged	laws	and	rights.
(d)	 It	provides	an	additional	source	of	 legal	authority,	 thus	 increasing	 the	
chances that a legal authority can be found to match what you already 
believe	to	be	the	best	result	from	a	policy	perspective.
(e)	 It	 assists	 the	work	of	establishing	enlightened	approaches	 to	 rights	 in	
emerging	democracies.
(f )	 The	importance	of	upholding	comity	between	judges	internationally.
(g)	 It	demonstrates	that	the	judicial	review	of	legislation	for	compatibility	with	
rights	also	happens	in	other	respectable	democracies.
(h)	 Other	—	please	specify.
Question 10
Which traits must other jurisdictions possess to justify their citation in a judgment 
about	domestic	rights?	Please	mark	as	many	as	appropriate.
(a)	 None	in	particular
(b)	 They	must	be	democratic
(c)	 They	must	be	a	“common	law”	jurisdiction
(d)	 They	must	speak	the	same	language
(e)	 They	must	have	close	historical	links	(such	as	a	colonial	association	etc)
(f )	 Other	—	please	specify
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Question 10A
If your answer would differ depending on whether you were using comparative 
material for guidance on extra-jurisdictional legal reasoning methods, extra-
jurisdictional moral perspectives or extra-jurisdictional factual experience, please 
indicate	how.
Question 11
Do	you	think	that	there	is	a	conflict	between	the	citation	of	comparative	material	in	
domestic rights’ judgments and democratic principles?
•	 Yes
•	 To some extent
•	 Not particularly
•	 No
•	 Don’t know
Question 12
Who is your judgments’ typical audience comprised of ?
(a)	 The	parties	to	the	dispute
(b)	 Respected	judges
(c)	 Agencies/Organs	of	the	State
(d)	 Subsequent	generations
(e)	 The	international	community,	broadly	conceived
(f )	 God
(g)	 Other	—	please	specify
Question 12A
Are you responsive to this audience’s attitude towards the use of comparative 
material?
•	 Yes
•	 To some extent
•	 Not particularly
•	 No
Question 13
Is your approach to comparison affected by a concern that you may not fully 
appreciate the legal and factual context surrounding material from other jurisdictions?
•	 Yes
•	 To some extent
•	 Not particularly
•	 No
•	 Don’t know
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Question 14
Have	personal	contacts	(outside	of	conferences)	with	judges	of	other	jurisdictions	
contributed to your analysis of domestic rights?
•	 Yes
•	 To some extent
•	 Not particularly
•	 No
•	 Don’t know
Question 15
“The constitutional protection of a country’s rights is best resolved by reference to 
national sources alone”
•	 Strongly agree with statement
•	 Agree with statement
•	 Disagree with statement
•	 Strongly disagree with statement
•	 Don’t know
Question 16
If,	at	a	conference,	you	had	to	decide	between	attending	five	different	speeches	on	
rights without knowing what topics the speeches would address, which would you 
choose?	Please	rate	in	order	of	priority.	5	=	highest
(a)	 The speech by the subordinate domestic judge
(b)	 The speech by a member of your own court
(c)	 The speech by a supreme court judge from abroad
(d)	 The speech by a domestic academic
(e)	 The speech by an academic from abroad
Question 17
If, delivering a conference paper on rights, you had to choose between an audience 
comprised entirely of one kind of attendee, which kind would you choose? Please 
rate	in	order	of	priority.	5	=	highest.
(a)	 An audience of subordinate domestic judges
(b)	 An audience of past and present members of your own court
(c)	 An audience of supreme court judges from abroad
(d)	 An audience of domestic academics
(e)	 An audience of academics from abroad
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Question 18
Do you consider your country’s constitution to be “living” in the sense that 
succeeding generations should be able to draw new or revised meanings therefrom?
•	 Yes
•	 To some extent
•	 Not particularly
•	 No
•	 Don’t know
Question 19
What is the main reason behind your use of domestic precedents?
•	 To indicate that you are taking a course that has been endorsed by respected 
professionals
•	 To	help	confirm	whether	your	particular	conclusion	is	on	the	right	track
•	 To promote a sense of predictability of legal outcome
•	 As a source of ideas as to how best to resolve the case at hand
•	 To free up judicial resources by reducing the need for in depth consideration 
of the case at hand
•	 Other — please specify
Participant	Comments	(optional):
